Predicts lower pay for Norwegian flight crews
International mergers reduce the influence of trade unions and lead to lower pay for crew, according to new research. Norwegian flight crews are facing tougher times, according to Professor Lars Sørgard.
Professor (on leave) Lars Sørgard
- Lars.Sorgard@nhh.no
- Telephone
- +47 55 95 97 23
- Department
- Economics
- Office
- E235
- Expertise
- Competition Economics Industrial Organization Competition Policy
BIOGRAPHY
Lars Sørgard has been a professor since 1998, and for the time being on leave and serving as Director General for Competition at the Norwegian Competition Authority.
His main research and teaching has been in the areas industrial organization, competitive strategy and competition policy. His teaching has been in courses such as industrial organization, competitive strategy and competition policy on both undergraduate, graduate and doctoral levels. He has published in journals such as RAND Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, European Economic Review, Marketing Science, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy and Marketing Science.
He was one of the founders of BECCLE – Bergen Center for Competition Law and Economics – and was one of the three in the leader team in BECCLE from its start in 2011. Moreover, he became the leader of the research center Industrial Organization when it was at NHH in the fall of 2014 until he resigned when he went on leave in August 2015. He was the chair of the board at SNF 2013-15, and he has been a member of the board of the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway since 2014.
Selected publications
| Author(s) | Title | Publisher |
|---|---|---|
| Clougherty, Joseph A.; Gugler, Klaus; Sørgard, Lars; Szücs, Florian W | Cross-border mergers and domestic-firm wages: Integrating "spillover effects" and "bargaining effects" | Journal of International Business Studies Volume 45 (4); page 450 - 470; 2014 |
| Sørgard, Lars | OPTIMAL MERGER POLICY: ENFORCEMENT VS. DETERRENCE | The Journal of Industrial Economics Volume 57 (3); page 438 - 456; 2009 |
| Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore; Sørgard, Lars | Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue? | Marketing science Volume 28 (6); page 1112 - 1128; 2009 |
| Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Sørgard, Lars; Straume, Odd Rune | National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly | RAND Journal of Economics Volume 37 (1); page 212 - 234; 2006 |
| Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea; Johansen, Bjørn Olav; Sørgard, Lars | Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects | International Journal of Industrial Organization Volume 74:102692; page 1 - 11; 2021 |
| Brekke, Kurt Richard; Sørgard, Lars; Tveito, Andreas | Effekter av konkurransereglene for norske forbrukere : | Samfunnsøkonomen Volume 133 (1); page 28 - 42; 2019 |
| Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea; Sørgard, Lars | Enforcement and deterrence in merger control: The case of merger remedies | Review of Law & Economics; 2017 |
| Pires, Armando; Kind, Hans Jarle; Sørgard, Lars | The effects of strategic news sources on media coverage. | Information Economics and Policy Volume 41; page 28 - 35; 2017 |
Dissemination
Bergen Centre for Competition Law and Economics opened
The Bergen Centre for Competition Law and Economics opened in 2011. Legal scholars and economists from the University of Bergen (UiB) and the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) have worked together in a unique research collaboration on competition policy.
Trying to smash cartels
'When a company is in the danger zone and there is a risk that the authorities will expose cartel activities, the lawyers turn up with an application form for leniency. There are lawyers who fly all over the world to save companies from huge fines and directors from prison sentences. As soon as they smell trouble for a company, they get in touch with the competition authorities so that they can apply for amnesty from prosecution.'
Big mergers must be dropped
A lot has gone wrong in the Greek economy in the last year - including in the air. Earlier this year, the EU Commission blocked the proposed merger between Olympic Air and Aegean Airlines. The reason given was that the merger might lead to the creation of a 'quasi-monopoly'. This will be one of the topics for discussion at the Annual Conference of the Association of Competition Economics (ACE) on 17 and 18 November.