Top publication by Bjerksund, Døskeland, Sjuve and Ørpetveit
The article "Forced to be Active: Evidence from a Regulation Intervention" has been published in Management Science.
Petter Bjerksund is a Professor of Finance and Management Science at NHH, the Norwegian School of Economics. He has a Master of Science degree (siviløkonom) from NHH and received his dr.oecon. degree at NHH in 1990.
His research interests include capital budgeting, investments, financial derivatives, risk management, real options, as well as financial aspects of energy and commodity markets. He has published in academic journals such as Journal of Fixed Income, Financial Management, Quantitative Finance, and Energy Journal. Bjerksund was Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science at NHH from 2002 to 2005.
Author(s) | Title | Publisher |
---|---|---|
Aase, Knut Kristian; Bjerksund, Petter | The Optimal Spending Rate versus the Expected Real Return of a Sovereign Wealth Fund | Journal of Risk and Financial Management Volume 14 (9) (35 pages); 2021 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Closed form spread option valuation | Quantitative finance (Print) Volume 14 (10); page 1785 - 1794; 2014 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar; Vagstad, Frank | Gas Storage Valuation: Price Modelling v. Optimization Methods | Energy Journal Volume 32 (1); page 203 - 227; 2011 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Rasmussen, Heine; Stensland, Gunnar | Valuation and Risk Management in the Norwegian Electricity Market | Energy Systems; page 167 - 185; 2010 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Myksvoll, Bjarte; Stensland, Gunnar | Exercising flexible load contracts: Two simple strategies | Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry Volume 24 (2); page 93 - 107; 2008 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar; Gjerde, Øystein | How to Extend the RiskMetrics™ Market Risk Universe | Finansparadigmet; page 145 - 156; 2002 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar; Brennan, Michael J.; Trigeorgis, Lenos | A Self-Enforced Dynamic Contract for Processing of Natural Resources | Project Flexibility, Agency, and Competition: New Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options; page 109 - 127; 1999 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Schjelderup, Guttorm | The political economy of capital controls and tax policy in a small open economy | European Journal of Political Economy Volume 14 (3); page 543 - 559; 1998 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Utledning av rentens terminstruktur ved "maksimum glatthets"-prinsippet | Beta Volume 10 (1); page 2 - 6; 1996 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Implementing the Black-Derman-Toy Interest Rate Model | Journal of Fixed Income Volume 6 (2); page 67 - 75; 1996 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Ekern, Steinar | Contingent Claims Evaluation of Mean-Reverting Cash Flows in Shipping | Real Options in Capital Investment; page 207 - 219; 1995 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Schjelderup, Guttorm | Capital Controls and Capital Flight | FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis (FA) Volume 52 (2); page 33 - 42; 1995 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | An American Call on the Difference of two Assets | International Review of Economics and Finance Volume 3 (1); page 1 - 26; 1994 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | American Exchange Options and a Put-Call Transformation: A Note | Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Volume 20 (5); page 761 - 764; 1993 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Closed Form Approximation of American Options | Scandinavian Journal of Management Volume 9; page S87 - S99; 1993 |
Main: Asset Management and Risk Analysis
Secondary: Business Taxation, Energy Markets, Resource Management and Sustainability
The article "Forced to be Active: Evidence from a Regulation Intervention" has been published in Management Science.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: Jøril Mæland and Karin Thorburn have the burden of proof and must substantiate their claims.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: Thore Johnsen and Terje Lensberg's arguments about wealth tax were refuted in 2016, proven to be logically inconsistent. There was never a response, so the line has been drawn and the error admitted. Now they are using them again.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: Wealth tax reduces investors' income, but at the same time it reduces investors' required return. The two effects offset each other, and Norwegian and foreign investors place the same value on the project.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: The corporate tax rate must be raised to 28 percent if it is to finance the abolition of the entire wealth tax, and to over 30 percent if the combined corporate and dividend tax is to be kept at the current level.
Petter Bjerksund, Arnt Ove Hopland and Guttorm Schjelderup: Calculation of tax costs necessarily requires data for tax and income, and we only get such data after the tax has been paid. A forward-looking, speculative method does not strengthen the tax debate.
Petter Bjerksund, Arnt Ove Hopland and Guttorm Schjelderup: If we remove the wealth tax, the effective tax is greatly reduced for the rich. For an investor, the tax drops from 21 percent to 15 percent just by assuming that the share capital is unlisted, not listed.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: Menon's "summary of knowledge" is tax propaganda. It polarises the debate, undermines NHO's reputation and prevents a tax policy compromise that could give companies stable tax framework conditions.
The very wealthiest benefit from a far lower effective tax burden compared to those earning slightly less, a new study shows.
Petter Bjerksund, Guttorm Schjelderup and Floris T. Zoutman: Menon's tax report for NHO misleads readers. It inflates the importance of wealth tax and sets up calculations that falsely double the effective average tax rate.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: It is not a good idea to remove the exemption method. But we can improve shareholder taxation by treating losses and gains from share sales equally, as well as raising the shielding rate.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: The real tax rate is 20 percent of the company's profit this year for a typical investor with a large fortune in a wholly owned, unlisted company. It is lower than under the Stoltenberg government.