Top publication by Trond E. Olsen
The article "Optimal Incentive Contracts With Bonus Caps" has been published in RAND Journal of Economics.
Trond E. Olsen is a Professor in Business and Management Science at NHH Norwegian School of Economics, and was a Professor of Economics at the University of Bergen before joining NHH. He received his PhD from Stanford University in 1986, and has been a visiting professor and scholar at, among others, Stanford University, MIT, UC San Diego, University of Toulouse and University of Munich.
His research interests include applications of contract theory, organizational economics, law and economics and financial economics. He is currently a co-leader of the Centre for research in Law and Economics of Markets and Organizations (LEMO) at NHH. He has published in leading academic journals such as American Economic Review, Econometrica, Management Science, Rand Journal of Economics, International Economic Review and Journal of Labor Economics.
Author(s) | Title | Publisher |
---|---|---|
Chi, Chang-Koo; Olsen, Trond Egil | Optimal Incentive Contracts With Bonus Caps | RAND Journal of Economics Volume 56 (1); page 55 - 73; 2025 |
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil | Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach | Journal of Accounting Research (34 pages); 2022 |
Watson, Joel; Miller, David A.; Olsen, Trond E. | Relational contracting, negotiation, and external enforcement | The American Economic Review Volume 110 (7); page 2153 - 2197; 2020 |
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil | Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs | Management science (11 pages); 2019 |
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. | The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay | Journal of Public Economics Volume 121; page 32 - 39; 2015 |
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. | Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting | The American Economic Review Volume 99 (5); page 2193 - 2208; 2009 |
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. | Team incentives in relational employment contracts | Journal of Labor Economics Volume 24 (1); page 139 - 169; 2006 |
Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin; Olsen, Trond E. | Career concerns, monetary incentives and job design | The Scandinavian Journal of Economics Volume 108 (2); page 299 - 316; 2006 |
Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter | Spillovers and international competition for investments | Journal of International Economics Volume 59 (1); page 211 - 238; 2003 |
Olsen, Trond; Osmundsen, Petter | Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership | Journal of Public Economics Volume 81 (2); page 253 - 277; 2001 |
Olsen, Trond E; Torsvik, Gaute | Collusion and renegotiation in hierarchies: A case of beneficial corruption | International Economic Review Volume 39, No. 2 (reprint); page 413 - 438; 1998 |
Olsen, Trond E. | Agency costs and the limits of integration | RAND Journal of Economics Volume 27 (3); page 479 - 501; 1996 |
Meyer, Meg; Olsen, Trond E; Torsvik, Gaute | Limited intertemporal commitment and job design | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; page 401 - 430; 1996 |
Olsen, Trond E.; Torsvik, Gaute | Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization? | European Economic Review Volume 39 (7); page 1405 - 1428; 1995 |
Konrad, Kai; Olsen, Trond E.; Schöb, Ronnie | Resource Extraction and the Threat of Possible Expropriation: The Role of Swiss Bank Accounts | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Volume 26 (2); page 149 - 162; 1994 |
Olsen, Trond E. | Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development | RAND Journal of Economics Volume 24 (4); page 529 - 541; 1993 |
Olsen, Trond E.; Stensland, Gunnar | On optimal timing of investment when cost components are additive and follow geometric diffusions | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Volume 16 (1); page 39 - 51; 1992 |
Olsen, Trond E. | Durable goods monopoly, learning-by-doing and the Coase conjecture | European Economic Review Volume 36 (1); page 157 - 177; 1992 |
David, Paul A.; Olsen, Trond E. | Technology adoption, learning spillovers, and the optimal duration of patent-based monopolies | International Journal of Industrial Organization Volume 10 (4); page 517 - 543; 1992 |
Olsen, Trond E. | Strategic considerations in invention and innovation; The case of natural resources revisited | Econometrica Volume 56 (4); page 841 - 849; 1988 |
Department of Business and Management Science, NHH
The article "Optimal Incentive Contracts With Bonus Caps" has been published in RAND Journal of Economics.
The article "Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach" has been published in Journal of Accounting Research.
The article "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement" has been published in The American Economic Review.
The article "Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs" has been published in Management Science.
The article "Relational contracts, multiple agents and correlated performances" by Ola Kvaløy and Trond E. Olsen has been accepted for publication by Management Science.