How Platforms and Algorithms Change Competition
On Tuesday 9 June Ole Kristian Dyskeland will hold a trial lecture on a prescribed topic and defend his thesis for the PhD degree at NHH.
Title of the thesis:
«Essays on Digital Platform Competition»
Summary:
Ole Kristian Dyskeland´ s thesis examines competition in digital markets, where information matters and firms have a different cost structure than traditional brick-and-mortar businesses.
The first three papers focus on media platforms, such as newspapers and streaming services. The fourth paper studies autonomous pricing algorithms (bots). Across the thesis, a common theme is that competition depends on practical details: who subscribes to what (papers 1-3), how content is distributed (1-3), how policy instruments are designed (3-4), and how digital firms set prices (1-4).
The first paper shows that platforms may sometimes prefer widely available content over exclusive content. Non-exclusive content can attract people who previously did not subscribed to any platform, while also making some people drop their second subscription. This matters because advertisers often value users who can only be reached through one platform.
The second paper asks why some content is available almost everywhere, as in music streaming, while other content is locked to one platform, as in video streaming. The answer depends on how differentiated the platforms already are. When platforms offer mostly the same content, consumers usually pick one service, so content owners and platforms both gain from making new content widely available. When platforms already offer many different exclusives, consumers are more willing to pay for several subscriptions. In that case, new content becomes more valuable if it is available only on one platform.
The third paper studies media policy and newspaper competition. Lower VAT can increase circulation for printed newspapers by reducing prices, but may have the opposite effect for digital newspapers. Because additional digital readers are inexpensive to serve, newspapers may respond by raising prices in order to retain more revenue. Direct subsidies are more reliable, but lower VAT and subsidies may push newspapers towards more exclusive content.
The fourth paper studies pricing bots. It shows that these algorithms may set high prices, but that high prices alone do not prove that they have learned to collude. Their behaviour depends strongly on how they are programmed.
Prescribed topic for the trial lecture:
«The effects of shopbots in platform markets
Trial lecture:
10:15, Aud M, NHH
Defense:
12:15, Aud M, NHH
Supervisors:
Professor Øystein Foros (main supervisor), Department of Business and Management Science, NHH
Professor Malin Arve, Department of Business and Management Science, NHH
Members of the evaluation committee:
Professor Mohamed Mardan (leader of the committee), Department of Business and Management Science, NHH
Professor Derek John Clark, University of Tromsø
Associate Professor Anna D´ Annunzio, Tor Vergata University, Rome