Faculty seminar: Tommaso Valletti Political Power and Market Power
The Department of Economics invites you to a Faculty seminar with Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College Business School.
- Time
- Place
- E209/E210
- Kalender
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Abstract
We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of an oligopoly that engages in lobbying shows that a merger may lead to an increase or a decrease in political influence activity. We combine data on mergers with data on lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions in the US from 1999 to 2017. We document a positive association between mergers and lobbying and we find some evidence for a positive association with contributions.
REGISTRATION
If you have any questions regarding the seminar, please contact the seminar organizers Kjell Gunnar Salvanes or Helene Bjørndal Fosse.