Faculty seminar: Tommaso Valletti Political Power and Market Power
The Department of Economics invites you to a Faculty seminar with Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College Business School.
- Time
- Place
- E209/E210
- Kalender
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Abstract
We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of an oligopoly that engages in lobbying shows that a merger may lead to an increase or a decrease in political influence activity. We combine data on mergers with data on lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions in the US from 1999 to 2017. We document a positive association between mergers and lobbying and we find some evidence for a positive association with contributions.
REGISTRATION
If you have any queries regarding the seminar, please contact the seminar organizers Katrine V. Løken, Heidi C. Thysen, Eirik G. Kristiansen or Helene Bjørndal Fosse.