Abstract
We develop an empirical model of overlapping ownership conduct. The model (i) links firm conduct parameters to deep parameters of the firm's process of shareholder preference aggregation through voting; (ii) can cope with ownership settings involving both intra- and inter-industry overlapping ownership; and (iii) yields an equilibrium flexible formulation for the management’s objective function that allows for no internalization, partial internalization and full internalization of shareholder objectives by managers. Using quarterly data for the U.S. airline industry in the 2015-2017 period, we find evidence for a partial internalization formulation in which the management puts significant weight on shareholder objectives, but appreciably less than in the full-internalization limiting case. We also find, focusing on the 2017Q4 period, that intra-industry overlapping ownership is associated with higher airline fares (mostly due to ownership by shareholders other than the “Big Three” asset managers) while inter-industry overlapping ownership is associated with lower airline fares (mostly due to ownership by the “Big Three” asset managers).