Theoretical Economics is on level 4 in the ABS Academic Journal Guide.

Agrawal, David R., Adib Bagh, and Mohammed Mardan: Sensitivity versus size: implications for tax competition, Theoretical Economics, 2025, 20(3), 1007-1041.

Abstract

The conventional wisdom is that a big jurisdiction sets a higher tax rate than a small jurisdiction. We show this result arises due to simplifying assumptions that imply tax-base sensitivities are equal across jurisdictions. When more than two jurisdictions compete in commodity taxes, tax-base sensitivities need not be equal across jurisdictions and a small jurisdiction can set a higher tax rate than a big jurisdiction. Our analysis extends to capital and profit taxes, and, more generally, to various types of multi-player asymmetric competition.

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