Intrinsic International Cooperation: Climate Change and the Evolution of Social Contracts

Abstract

In this study, I employ a two-country evolutionary game-theoretical framework to analyze the interplay between public investments in climate change mitigation efforts and the degree of citizen support required to foster a social contract aimed to sustain international cooperation. I argue that strategic investments in climate policies by one country can foster a virtuous cycle, enhancing civic mindedness at the national level in the other country and ultimately promoting cooperative behavior on a global level. Conversely, reductions in climate mitigation efforts by one country can diminish reciprocal behavior towards climate action in the other country, weakening their domestic social contract that is fundamental to achieving effective and collective climate action. The findings highlight the importance of incorporating domestic societal and political dimensions into theoretical models of international climate cooperation and further emphasize the potential of coordinated efforts to enhance domestic civic culture to advance climate resilience.

Registration

If you have any questions regarding the seminar, please contact the seminar organizers Mateusz Mysliwski or Camilla Nesfossen Hopsdal