



CHARACTERIZATIONS OF STABILITY



Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson

University of Iowa and Stanford University




Motive for Equilibrium Selection

The original Nash definition allows


1. Multiple equilibria
2. Dominated strategies to be used
3. Implausible beliefs in extensive form
4. Unstable equilibria that disappear
if the game is perturbed

Selection tries to exclude 2-3-4



Some Normal-Form Selections


■ Perfect	<i>Selten</i>	1975
■ Proper	<i>Myerson</i>	1978
■ Lexicographic	<i>Blume-Brandenberger- Dekel</i>	1991
■ Stable sets	<i>Kohlberg-Mertens</i> <i>Mertens</i>	1986 1989



Some Extensive-Form Selections


- Subgame Perfect *Selten 1965*
- Extensive-form Perfect *Selten 1975*
- Sequential *Kreps-Wilson 1982*
- Quasi-Perfect *van Damme 1984*

◆ *A basic goal is to unify the
Normal-Form and Extensive-Form
perspectives*




The Kohlberg-Mertens Program

1. Specify desirable properties or axioms
 - Assume set-valued selections
 - Genericity of extensive game $\Rightarrow$ (within a component) all equilibria have the same outcome
 2. Define selections that achieve basic criteria
 - Invariance, admissibility, backward & forward induction ...
- Mertens-Stability meets ALL their criteria *but* it depends on a topological construction
 - We report results about
 - ◆ Hyperstability
 - ◆ Stability



◆ Hyperstable Set of Equilibria

- *Definition:* Each payoff perturbation of each inflation of the game has an equilibrium whose deflation is near the set
 - Inflation appends redundant pure strategies
 - Treats some mixed strategies as pure strategies
 - Deflation converts back to equivalent mixture of the original pure strategies
- Inflation/Deflation invoke the Axiom of Invariance to presentation effects




Characterization of Hyperstable Components

- **Theorem: A component is hyperstable
if and only if its index is nonzero**
 - Thus hyperstability is a topological property
Verify hyperstability by computing an index

Relation to prior literature:

- **Definition:** A component of fixed points is essential
if each map nearby has a fixed point nearby
- **Theorem:** A component of fixed points is essential
iff its index is nonzero [O'Neill 1953]


So hyperstable components are essential
whereas Mertens 1989 imposes essentiality



Main Steps of Proof


To show $\text{Index} = 0 \Rightarrow \text{not-hyperstable}$

1. $\text{Index} = 0 \Rightarrow \exists \text{ map } \sigma \rightarrow G(\sigma) = G \oplus g(\sigma)$
to nearby perturbed games such that no σ
near the component is an equilibrium of $G(\sigma)$
 - This step extends KM's Structure Theorem
2. Using simplicial approximation of map g
construct perturbed inflated games $G^*(\sigma)$
3. Hyperstability $\Rightarrow (\exists \sigma^*) \sigma^*$ is an equilibrium
of $G^*(\sigma)$, where $\sigma = \text{deflation of } \sigma^*$
 $\Rightarrow \sigma$ is an equilibrium of $G(\sigma)$
 $\Rightarrow \text{contradiction !}$



◆ Stable Set of Equilibria


- *Definition:* Each perturbed game obtained by shrinking the simplex of mixed strategies has an equilibrium near the set
 - Shrinking via η means each $\sigma \rightarrow (1-\varepsilon)\sigma + \varepsilon\eta$
 - KM require a *minimal* stable set
- A stable set is truly perfect
 - It is perfect against every tremble η
- Stability excludes dominated strategies
 - But hyperstability allows them



Stability Characterization for 2 players

Theorem: A closed set S contains a KM-stable set *if and only if*

- For each tremble η there exist profiles σ & τ and $\varepsilon \in (0,1]$, where $\sigma \in S$, such that each pure strategy used in either σ *or* τ is an optimal reply to both σ *and* $(1-\varepsilon)\tau + \varepsilon\eta$
 - That is, perturbing τ by tremble η “respects preferences” [Blume-Brandenberger-Dekel 1991]
 - Generalizes the characterization for generic signaling games [Cho-Kreps & Banks-Sobel 1988]
- ***N* players:** analog lexicographic condition



Axioms for Stability

Our approach mixes ***normal-form*** and ***extensive-form*** criteria

◆ Our normal-form criterion is

■ **Axiom 1** ***Weak Invariance***

Selection should be immune to inflation


– That is, exclude presentation effects

◆ Our extensive-form criterion is

■ **Axiom 2** ***Strong Backward Induction***


For an extensive game, trembles should select admissible sequential equilibria

– Formulation of Axiom 2 uses ε -Quasi-Perfection



ε -Quasi-Perfect in Extensive Game with Perfect Recall


- *Definition:* An action at an information set is optimal (for tremble η) if it begins an optimal continuation strategy using beliefs induced by perturbations toward η
- *Definition:* $\sigma > 0$ is ε -QP if suboptimal actions have cond. probabilities $\leq \varepsilon$ [van Damme 1984]
- Proper $\Rightarrow$ QP $\Rightarrow$ Sequential equilibrium
but QP excludes conditionally dominated strategies



Axiom 2 Using Strong Quasi-Perfect


Require lower bounds on behavior strategies
Then:

- **Axiom 2:** Each tremble should select some strong-QP-equilibrium from the set
 - Axiom 2 is stringent: robust to all trembles
Requires that selection is "truly" Quasi-Perfect
 - Use of trembles is akin to Mertens' use of a "germ" inducing beliefs
 - Mertens-stable sets satisfy Axioms 1 and 2
 - Could use lexicographic or equiprobable instead?



Sufficiency Theorem

- **Theorem:** Axioms 1 & 2 imply that a selected set includes a KM-stable set
 - Corollary: If an extensive game is generic then selection yields a stable outcome
 - Axiom *Proper* is sufficient for simple games (generic signaling, outside-option, and perfect-information games) but insufficient generally
 - Add Axiom *Homotopy* $\Rightarrow$ Mertens-stable set



Sketch of Proof

1. Construct inflated extensive game in which each player chooses either
 - the tremble with minimum probability $\geq \varepsilon$ or
 - plays the original game with the maximum probability of a suboptimal strategy $\leq \varepsilon \times \varepsilon$
2. Each tremble and ε -QP sequence induces a lexicographic equilibrium
3. The lexicographic equilibrium satisfies the Characterization Theorem for KM-stable set

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