De Haan presents at University of Copenhagen
On 7 March, The Choice Lab researcher Thomas de Haan presents the project "Fairness Preferences in the face of Limited Information" at the University of Copenhagen.
In this project we investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the role of limited information about performance in a collective production task on redistributional preferences.
In our study we focus both on distribution decisions by one of two matched workers, as well as distribution decisions made by a monetarily unaffected spectator. For both the setting with a stakeholder and a spectator redistribution decision, we will compare two situations. One, where decision makers have full information regarding what influence worker performance and what influence 'random factor' luck had in determining the workers' contribution to the total income. Two, where decision makers have limited information regarding the worker's actual performance.
Using the fairness preferences model from Cappelen et al. (2007, AER) as a basis, we predict that stakeholders who are ex ante pessimistic about other workers' performance, should become less prone to redistribute in the face of limited information if they hold a meritocratic fairness ideal. In contrast meritocratic spectators are predicted to become more egalitarian in their redistribution choices when facing limited information. We report the results of a laboratory experiment conducted in May in Bergen.