De Haan presents at University of Bergen

1 March 2017 12:56

(updated: 1 March 2017 13:06)

De Haan presents at University of Bergen

On 2 March, The Choice Lab researcher Thomas de Haan presents the paper "Fairness Preferences in the face of Limited Information" at the University of Bergen.

The paper is written jointly with fellow The Choice Lab researchers Caroline Bonn, Alexander Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden. For more information about the project, see the abstract below.

Date: 2 March
Time: 12:45-14:00
Place: Seminar room on the top floor of the Faculty of Social Sciences building adjacent to the Department of Economics at UiB.

In this project we investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the role of limited information about performance in a collective production task on redistributional preferences.

In our study we focus both on distribution decisions by one of two matched workers, as well as distribution decisions made by a monetarily unaffected spectator. For both the setting with a stakeholder and a spectator redistribution decision, we will compare two situations. One, where decision makers have full information regarding what influence worker performance and what influence 'random factor' luck had in determining the workers' contribution to the total income. Two, where decision makers have limited information regarding the worker's actual performance.

Using the fairness preferences model from Cappelen et al. (2007, AER) as a basis, we predict that stakeholders who are ex ante pessimistic about other workers' performance, should become less prone to redistribute in the face of limited information if they hold a meritocratic fairness ideal. In contrast meritocratic spectators are predicted to become more egalitarian in their redistribution choices when facing limited information. We report the results of a laboratory experiment conducted in May in Bergen.