De Haan presents at Humboldt University, Berlin
On July 4, The Choice Lab researcher Thomas de Haan presents the paper ”Fairness Preferences in the Face of Limited Information” in a seminar series at the Humboldt University, Berlin.
Earlier de Haan presented the paper at the Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory on June 15 and the WSF Thematic Workshop on Inequality and the Welfare State. The workshop took place on June 19-20 in Oslo.
”Fairness in the Face of Limited Information” by Thomas de Haan, Alexander Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden, and Caroline Bonn (FPRWS)
In this project we investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the role of limited information about performance in a collective production task on redistributional preferences.
In our study, we focus both on distribution decisions by one of two matched workers, as well as on distribution decisions made by a monetarily unaffected spectator. For both the setting with a stakeholder and a spectator redistribution decision, we will compare two situations. One, where decision makers have full information regarding what influence worker performance and what influence 'random factor' luck had in determining the workers' contribution to the total income. Two, where decision makers have limited information regarding the worker's actual performance.
Building on the fairness preferences model from Cappelen et al. (2007, AER), we predict that stakeholders who are ex-ante pessimistic about other workers' performance, should become less prone to redistribute in the face of limited information if they hold a meritocratic fairness ideal. In contrast, meritocratic spectators are predicted to become more egalitarian in their redistribution choices when facing limited information. We report the results of a laboratory experiment conducted in Bergen in 2016 as well as recently in May 2017.