We are happy to announce the annual seminar on the economics of corruption will take place on September 30. This year’s guest is Assistant Professor Mihály Fazekas (Central European University). The seminar is free of charge, but registration for attending the lunch is required.
Title of talk: Elections and corruption: incentives to steal or incentives to invest?
Despite the fact that most political systems around the world now hold regular multi-party elections, we know little about the effect of elections on political corruption. To address this gap in the literature, we employ a multi-method research design—combining unmatched and matched quantitative comparisons with a qualitative small-N study of Indonesia and the Philippines—to analyse a novel government contracting dataset that provides objective measurements of corruption.
We find that, all things being equal, corruption risks increases in the immediate pre-election period by 1.3-6.1% points (measured as single bidding in competitive tenders). Moreover, we are able to demonstrate that the corruption-enhancing effect of elections among low and middle income countries is stronger under conditions of (i) high electoral competitiveness, (ii) mid-level party institutionalisation, and (iii) “localised club goods” clientelism.
The 2019 Annual Seminar on the Economics of Corruption is supported by