Trond Egil Olsen

 

E-mail:

Trond.Olsen@nhh.no

Trond Olsen

Telephone:

+47 55 95 99 76

Fax:

+47 55 95 96 50

Title:

Professor, Ph. D., Stanford University 1986

Nationality:

Norwegian

Teaching languages:

Norwegian, English


Teaching areas:
  • Financial Contracting

  • Game Theory


Research areas: Present:
  • Contracts and Incentives

  • Organizational Economics

Former:
  • Industrial Organization

  • Regulation and Taxation

  • Resource Economics


Selected publications:

 

  • The rise of individual performance pay, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2012, 21(2), 493-518 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Multinationals, tax competition and outside options, Journal of Public Economics, 2011, 95(11/12), 1579-1588 (with Petter Osmundsen); doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.004.

  • Tournaments with prize-setting agents, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2011, 113(3), 729-753 (with Kristoffer W. Eriksen and Ola Kvaløy).

  • Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting, American Economic Review, 2009, 99(5), 2193-2208 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms, Journal of Human Capital, 2008, 2(4), 410-440 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization, Journal of the Japanese & International Economies, 2008, 22(2), 229-241 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2008, 17(1), 149-183 (with Oddvar Kaarbøe).

  • Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job Design, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108(2), 299-316 (with Oddvar Kaarbøe).

  • Team incentives in relational contracts, Journal of Labor Economics, 2006, 24(1), 139-169 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Sharing of endogenous risk in construction, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2005, 58(4), 511-526 (with Petter Osmundsen).

  • Spillovers and international competition for investments, Journal of International Economics, 2003, 59(1), 211-238 (with Petter Osmundsen).

  • Strategic tax competition: implications of national ownership, Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 81(2), 253-277 (with Petter Osmundsen).

  • Discretion and Incentives in Organizations, Journal of Labor Economics, 2000, 18(3), 377-404 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption, International Economic Review, 1998, 39(2), 413-438 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1996, 31(3), 401-417 (with Margaret A. Meyer and Gaute Torsvik).

  • Agency Costs and the Limits of Integration, Rand Journal of Economics, 1996, 27(3), 479-501.

  • On Optimal Control of Income Generating Activities, and the Value of Flexible Production Design, International Review of Economics and Finance, 1996, 5(4), 349-361 (with Gunnar Stensland).

  • Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How Much Decentralization?, European Economic Review, 1995, 39(7), 1405-1428 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1993, 9(1), 136-158 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development, Rand Journal of Economics, 1993, 24(4), 529-541.

  • Technology Adoption, Learning Spillovers, and the Optimal Duration of Patent-Based Monopolies, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1992, 10(4), 517-543 (with Paul A. David).

  • Technological Diffusion in Primary Health Care, Journal of Health Economics, 1992, 11(4), 439-452 (with Liv Marit Klausen and Alf Erling Risa).

  • Durable Goods Monopoly, Learning by Doing and the Coase Conjecture, European Economic Review, 1992, 36(1), 157-177.

  • On Optimal Timing of Investment When Cost Components Are Additive and Follow Geometric Diffusions, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1992, 16(1), 39-51 (with Gunnar Stensland).

  • Simple Rules to Order Irreversible Income Alternatives Sequentially, Economics Letters, 1991, 35(2), 193-199 (with Gunnar Stensland).

  • Strategic Considerations in Invention and Innovation; The Case of Natural Resources Revisited, Econometrica, 1988, 56(4), 841-849.