Olsen, Trond E.

Trond Egil Olsen

E-mail:

Trond.Olsen@nhh.no

Trond Olsen

Telephone:

+47 55 95 99 76

Fax:

+47 55 95 96 50

Title:

Professor/Deputy Head of Department, Ph. D., Stanford University 1986

Nationality:

Norwegian

Teaching languages:

Norwegian, English


 


 

Teaching areas:

Financial Contracting

 

Game Theory


 


 

 

Research:

Present:

 Incentives  
     Contracts  
     Organizational Economics  

 

Former:

 Industrial organization  
     Regulation  
     Resource economics  


 


 

 

Selected publications:

 

  • Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting, American Economic Review, 99(5), 2009, 2193-2208 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms, Journal of Human Capital, 2(4), 2008, 410-440 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization, Journal of the Japanese & International Economies, 22(2), 2008, 229-241 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17(1), 2008, 149-183 (with Oddvar Kaarbøe).

  • Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job Design, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 108(2), 2006, 299-316 (with Oddvar Kaarbøe).

  • Team incentives in relational contracts, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 24(1), 2006, 139-169 (with Ola Kvaløy).

  • Sharing of endogenous risk in construction, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 58, 2005, 511-26 (with Petter Osmundsen).

  • Spillovers and international competition for investments, Journal of International Economics, vol. 59, 2003, 211-238 (with Petter Osmundsen).

  • Strategic tax competition: implications of national ownership, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 81(2), 2001, 253-277 (with Petter Osmundsen).

  • Discretion and Incentives in Organizations, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 18(3), July 2000, 377-404 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption, International Economic Review, vol. 39(2), May 1998, 413-438 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 31(3), December 1996, 401-417 (with Margaret A. Meyer and Gaute Torsvik).

  • Agency Costs and the Limits of Integration, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 27(3), Autumn 1996, 479-501.

  • On Optimal Control of Income Generating Activities, and the Value of Flexible Production Design, International Review of Economics and Finance, vol. 5( 4), 1996, 349-361 (with Gunnar Stensland).

  • Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How Much Decentralization?, European Economic Review, vol. 39(7), August 1995, 1405-1428 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 9(1), April 1993, 136-158 (with Gaute Torsvik).

  • Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 24(4), Winter 1993, 529-541.

  • Technology Adoption, Learning Spillovers, and the Optimal Duration of Patent-Based Monopolies, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 10(4), December 1992, 517-543 (with Paul A. David).

  • Technological Diffusion in Primary Health Care, Journal of Health Economics, vol. 11(4), December 1992, 439-452 (with Liv Marit Klausen and Alf Erling Risa).

  • Durable Goods Monopoly, Learning by Doing and the Coase Conjecture, European Economic Review, vol. 36(1), January 1992, 157-177.

  • On Optimal Timing of Investment When Cost Components Are Additive and Follow Geometric Diffusions, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 16(1), January 1992, pp. 39-51 (with Gunnar Stensland).

  • Simple Rules to Order Irreversible Income Alternatives Sequentially, Economics Letters, vol. 35(2), February 1991, 193-199 (with Gunnar Stensland).

  • Strategic Considerations in Invention and Innovation; The Case of Natural Resources Revisited, Econometrica, vol. 56(4), July 1988, 841-849.